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Abstract: 
   
    
   Fundamental indexing based on accounting valuation has drawn significant interest from 
academics and practitioners in recent times as an alternative to capitalization weighted 
indexing based on market valuation. This paper investigates the claims of superiority of 
fundamental indexation strategy by using data for Australian Securities Exchange (ASX) listed 
stocks between 1985 and 2010. Not only do our results strongly support the outperformance 
claims observed in other geographical markets, we find that the excess returns from 
fundamental indexation in Australian market are actually much higher. The fundamental 
indexation strategy does underperform during strong bull markets although this effect 
diminishes with longer time horizons. On a rolling five years basis, the fundamental index 
always outperforms the capitalization-weighted index. Contrary to many previous studies, our 
results show that superior performance of fundamental indexation could not be attributed to 
value, size, or momentum effects. Overall, the findings indicate that fundamental indexation 
could offer potential outperformance of traditional indexation based on market capitalization 
even after adjusting for the former’s slightly higher turnover and transaction costs. 
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1.  Introduction 
Passive portfolio management has gained in popularity over last few decades. Prior to the 
1960s, the conventional wisdom was professional money managers were able to generate 
‘above average’ returns owing to their superior skills compared to the lay investor. Since 
then, academic research in financial economics has increasingly unearthed evidence to the 
contrary. The inability of a vast majority of actively managed funds to consistently 
outperform the market has put a serious question mark over the claim of their possessing 
superior skills. That active investing involves much higher transaction costs (due to turnover) 
and management fees has made them less appealing to the modern investor. On the other 
hand, this has resulted in significant growth of investments in passively managed index 
funds. Vanguard, an investment management company that specialises in index funds, 
managed assets worth $1.4 trillion worldwide (of which $80 billion is in Australia alone) as 
of June 2010 (Vanguard, 2010). The Vanguard 500 Index fund, which made its debut in 1976 
and tracks the S&P 500 index, is now one of the largest equity funds in the world.  
Index funds tracking market capitalization based indices like S&P 500 are the most well 
known form of passive management, so much so that most consider them as identical. Elton, 
Gruber, Brown, and Goetzmann (2007) argue that this is essentially arbitrary and misleading.  
These authors define passive management as any form of portfolio management that is 
governed by a mechanical rule based on past data and not on forecasts of the manager. There 
are several portfolio management strategies that come under this more inclusive definition. 
Some of these are based on observed stock market anomalies like small company (low 
market capitalization) stocks earning higher risk adjusted return relative to large company 
(high market capitalization) stocks or low price earnings (P/E) ratio stocks outperforming 
high P/E stocks. The genesis of this lie in attempts to better passive management strategies 
that are purely based on tracking broad market capitalization based indices.  
One such strategy that is currently attracting a lot of attention is the fundamental indexation 
strategy proposed by Arnott, Hsu, Moore (2005) (hereafter AHM). They argue that if stock 
prices are too noisy relative to their fundamentals, then by construction market capitalization 
weighted indexes would suffer from a price drag by becoming overweight in shares that are 
overpriced and underweight in shares that are underpriced relative to their fair value. As an 
alternative, the authors put forward a non-capitalization based indexing that assigns weight 
on stocks based on alternative measures of size like sales, cash flow, book value and Page 3 of 37 
 
dividends. They call this fundamental indexation as weighting of stocks is based on 
accounting measures as proxies of fundamental value. The authors argue that by construction 
the fundamental index is not affected by valuation biases caused by market noise. The study 
finds that such a strategy outperforms cap-weighted strategy based on US market data over a 
period of 43 years. 
Since the publication of the AHM study, fundamental indexation has drawn significant 
interest from academics and practitioners. While there has been some support for the 
fundamental indexing strategy in other markets, controversy has emerged on different fronts. 
The main criticism has been that it is actually a value strategy in disguise and does little 
beyond capturing the value premium. Second, the failings of the strategy in conditions of 
persistent mispricing have been pointed out. Finally, questions have been raised on the higher 
turnover costs of fundamental indexing compared to tracking a market capitalization 
weighted index as the latter requires very little rebalancing. 
In this paper, we investigate the above issues on fundamental indexation with data from the 
Australian Securities Exchange (ASX) over a period of 25 years between 1985 and 2010. 
With respect to the superiority of fundamental indexation over cap weighted indexation, our 
results are broadly supportive of the findings of the AHM study. However, like some other 
subsequent studies, we find the fundamental indexation strategy to underperform during 
strong bull markets although this effect diminishes with longer time horizons. Overall, our 
findings indicate that fundamental indexation could offer potential outperformance of 
traditional market cap-weighted indexation even after adjusting for slightly higher transaction 
costs related to turnover. 
Our paper makes two important contributions. First, the bulk of research on fundamental 
indexation has been conducted using data for the US and European markets. By exploring the 
data for the Australian stock market, where fundamental indexation strategy is being 
employed by some practitioners, we extend the geographic dimension of research in this area. 
The only study to have examined fundamental indexation in the Australian market is Mar, 
Bird, Casavecchia, and Yeung (2009). However, their study covered a limited period from 
1995 to 2006 which, by the authors’ own admission, characterised a ‘value period’ in 
Australian stock market. Our coverage of the 25-year period between 1985 and 2010 not only 
substantially extends the time horizon but more importantly captures significant market 
downturns of 1987 and more recent crisis of 2008-2009. Thus it allows for a richer analysis Page 4 of 37 
 
through varied economic conditions and stock market cycles and testing whether prior results 
on various aspects of fundamental indexation still hold up. We also examine a wider range of 
variables as proxies of fundamentals than AHM or any of the studies individually. Some of 
these variables are unique to this study. Our results show that the excess returns derived from 
investing in fundamental indexation strategy in the Australian market is substantially higher 
than what has been observed in the US and European markets.  
Second, we show that the excess returns of fundamental indexation over market cap-weighted 
indexation are not explained by value, size, or momentum factors. This is in stark contrast to 
several past empirical studies in the US (e.g. Jun and Malkiel (2008), Blitz and Swinkel 
(2009)) and international markets (e.g. Estrada, 2006) that find the superior performance of 
fundamental indexation could be mainly attributed to its value tilt. Similarly, the only 
previous study of fundamental indexation in Australian market by Mar et al (2009) found that 
its superiority is explained by increased exposure to value stocks. Our evidence is not 
supportive of this claim and suggests the need for further research about the source of 
outperformance.  
 
2.  Background and Prior Research 
Fundamental indexation proposed by AHB and researched by subsequent studies is based on 
accounting valuation measures. The use of accounting data for security selection is not a new 
practice among investors. In fact, it greatly predates academic research in this area by many 
decades. There is anecdotal evidence of analysts (then known as statisticians) in Wall Street 
using limited accounting information of companies in asset valuation. Benjamin Graham, 
widely regarded as the pioneer of security analysis, used mainly accounting figures as the 
basis for stock selection. Graham and Dodd’s book ‘Security Analysis’, which first went in 
print on 1934, emphasized the use of sales, earnings, dividends, current assets, book value, 
and cash in determining whether stocks of individual companies are overvalued or 
undervalued. This approach is commonly known as fundamental analysis and is about finding 
the fundamental or intrinsic value of a company’s stock based on information reported in 
financial statements.
1 Friend (1977) and Blume and Friend (1978) suggest that investors rely 
on accounting data in making investing decisions. Barlev and Levy (1981) find that using ex-
                                                             
1 Fundamental analysis by market practitioners would normally include future projections of these accounting 
variables. Page 5 of 37 
 
post accounting data for optimal portfolio selection from stocks listed in the Dow Jones index 
can be as effective as using ex-post market data.  
In recent years, there has been renewed interest in stock selection based on accounting data 
motivated by research confirming post-earnings announcement drift in security prices. Ou & 
Penman (1989) show the existence of significant abnormal returns to an investment strategy 
that is based on the prediction of the sign of future changes in earnings per share (EPS) which 
they forecast using an exhaustive list of accounting ratios describing leverage, activity, and 
profitability extracted from the current accounting data. Similarly, Holthausen and Larcker 
(1992) find evidence of abnormal returns using a predictive model based on accounting 
ratios. Abarbanell & Bushee (1998) demonstrate that an investment strategy based on the 
fundamental signals extracted from financial statements like change in inventories, accounts 
receivables, gross margin among others, generate abnormal returns. Piotroski (2000) provides 
further evidence supporting the predictive ability of historical accounting signals about future 
stock price changes for a sample of value stocks (i.e. stocks with high book-to-market ratio). 
These results suggest that historical accounting information can predict future stock 
performance. 
  
Modern finance, however, takes a dim view of the attempt to use past information in making 
profitable investment decisions. According to the efficient market hypothesis (EMH) all 
available information is already incorporated in the current market prices of securities. This 
rules out the possibility of generating abnormal returns using information that is already 
available to investor, which includes accounting data. Under the framework of the well 
known capital market asset pricing model CAPM of Sharpe (1964) and Lintner (1965) the 
market portfolio i.e. a portfolio which holds securities weighted by their market capitalization 
is shown to be mean-variance efficient. Therefore, to beat the cap-weighted market index 
investors must hold a portfolio that is riskier than the market portfolio. 
The above theoretical argument for optimality of the capitalization weighted market portfolio 
is further bolstered by empirical studies of mutual fund performance. Starting with the 
seminal study of Jensen (1968), many researchers have examined the performance of fund 
managers relative to the market index. The bulk of the empirical evidence till this date 
indicates that the majority of active fund managers underperform the market index on a risk-
adjusted basis. For example, by examining the performance of all US equity mutual funds 
during 1971-91 period, Malkiel (1995) finds that funds in aggregate underperformed the Page 6 of 37 
 
benchmark index both before and after accounting for management expenses. According to 
Gruber (1996), who investigated performance of active equity funds in USA from 1985 to 
1994, funds underperform an appropriately weighted average of indexes. Gotezmann and 
Zheng (2006) examine the aggregate performance of all equity funds that existed in the CRSP 
database since its inception till 2004. They report underperformance both for value-weighted 
as well as equally weighted portfolios created with those funds. 
From the efficient market perspective, it is remarkable that the AHM study of 2005 puts 
forward an indexing strategy based on fundamental metrics derived from historical 
accounting data that so easily outperforms the cap-weighted market portfolio on a risk-
adjusted basis. The authors create a composite index called the ‘fundamental index’ by 
combining the four metrics of book value, sales, cash flow and dividends. They find that, 
between 1964 and 2002, the fundamental index outperforms the comparable cap-weighted 
index (S&P 500) by almost 2% per annum while displaying the same volatility as the latter. 
Treynor (2005) tenders his view on the benefits of valuation-indifferent indexing through the 
examination of stock mispricing. He shows that the return drag on a market cap-weighted 
index is approximately equal to the noise in stock prices. Siegel (2006) also suggests that if 
stock prices are subject to noise then cap-weighted indexes maintain a risk-return profile 
inferior to that of the fundamental index as portfolio construction technique.
2 
 
Tamura and Shimizu (2005) conducts a study similar to the AHM in a global context. They 
construct global fundamental indexes using the same composite index metrics as AHM and 
tested these for the period January 1988 to August 2005. The results indicated their global 
fundamental index portfolio exceeded the returns of the cap-weighted MSCI World and 
FTSE Developed indexes with lower volatility. Hsu and Campollo (2006) investigate the 
source of the outperformance of fundamental index over cap-weighted indexes. The research 
also discusses periods of underperformance of the fundamental index, specifically the “tech 
bubble”, in the context of sector allocation. They argue that since the volatility of relative 
prices is higher than the volatility of relative fundamental metrics, the sector allocations 
within a fundamental index portfolio remain steadier than those in a cap-weighted portfolio.  
 
                                                             
2 Although most studies on fundamental indexation focussed on equities, they have been tested on markets for 
other asset categories. Arnott, Hsu, Li and Shepherd (2010) extend the valuation-indifferent methodology to 
investment grade, high yield and emerging market bonds and also report outperformance over the relevant 
valuation-weighted benchmarks. Hsu, Li and Kalesnik (2009) look into market valuation-indifferent weighting 
in real estate in the US and international markets and find evidence of outperformance. Page 7 of 37 
 
Estrada (2008) applies fundamental indexation technique to international diversification by 
giving each country a weight according to its dividend per share and then measuring the 
portfolio performance (using country ETFs as the investable security). The findings suggest 
that over a 32-year (1974-2005) period, the dividend-weighted fundamental index 
outperformed the cap-weighted index on an absolute as well as on a risk-adjusted basis. 
However, the author also found that a simple value strategy based on dividend yield would 
have outperformed the fundamental indexation strategy for the same period. Walkshäusl and 
Lobe (2010) use data from 1982 to 2008 to create a global fundamental index as well as 
individual country indexes for 28 developed and 22 emerging markets. In addition to the 
fundamental metrics used by AHM - book value, cash flows, dividend paid, employees, 
income and sales - the authors test the net payout metric, defined as dividends paid plus cash 
used for repurchases minus cash received from issuances. Although they find evidence of 
global fundamental index outperforming global cap-weighted index, the evidence for 
outperformance of individual country-specific indexes is not compelling. 
 
One of the main critiques of fundamental indexation is that it is a strategy to capture value 
premium already well documented in literature (Ball, 1978; Stattman, 1980; Fama and 
French, 1992) but is not as effective at capturing the value effect as an intentional value tilt 
would be.
3 Jun and Malkiel (2008) examines the returns of the fundamental index and 
conclude that the methodology does not add any value above that which is explained by the 
Fama and French three-factor model.  Blitz and Swinkels (2009) critique follows the same 
line – that fundamental indexation is simply an active value strategy. They find that more 
sophisticated quantitative strategies, capturing more than one market anomaly, may provide a 
better risk-return profile for investors. Amenc, Goultz and Le Sourd (2009) show that when 
this value bias is adjusted for, the published fundamental index RAFI 1000 Index does not 
outperform the market cap-weighted index. Perold (2007) examines the theory behind 
fundamental indexation, the ‘noisy market hypothesis’, and argues that it is “fundamentally 
flawed”. His primary criticism of the theory revolves around the assertion by fundamental 
index proponents that one can outperform the cap-weighted index without knowing fair 
value. The paper also states that the fundamental index performance suffers in conditions of 
persistent mispricing or under-reacting stock prices.  
 
                                                             
3 Some critiques argue that, apart from value premium, it is also an attempt to capture size premium (Banz, 
1981) to a small extent. Page 8 of 37 
 
The only published study to investigate fundamental indexation exclusively in the Australian 
stock market is Mar, Bird, Casavecchia and Yeung (2009). They create fundamental index 
portfolios on the metrics of book value-to-equity, three-year rolling average cashflows and 
three-year rolling average revenue for the period 1995 to 2006. They find that the composite 
fundamental index outperforms the market cap-weighted reference portfolio by an average of 
1.93% per year. The only time it is found to underperform is during the “tech bubble”. Using 
the Carhart four-factor model, the authors find that the fundamental index exhibits a 
significant value bias, while size and momentum are not significant factors in the explaining 
the excess return. Finally, their paper demonstrates that the fundamental index is not 
disadvantaged by liquidity and turnover. The effect of transaction costs is examined and it is 
found that a 1% transaction cost is not sufficient to cancel out the excess return.  
 
Some of the global research on fundamental indexation covers Australia by default. For 
example, Tamura and Shimizu (2005) holds a fundamental-weighted portfolio of 80 
Australian stocks from January 1988 to August 2005. They found the Australian region index 
to outperform the benchmark on a statistically significant basis with a beta of less than one. 
Walkshäusl and Lobe (2010) also find that the fundamental index portfolio in Australia was 
one of the few that beat the benchmark at a statistically significant level after controlling for 
data snooping. 
   
3.  Data and Index Construction 
3.1 Data 
Our dataset covers a period of 25 years between April 1985 and March 2010. It includes data 
on returns of ASX listed companies as well as on a range of fundamental measures like sales, 
book value (BV), operating profit (OP), earnings before interest and tax (EBIT), dividends, 
and employee numbers. The data on fundamental measures for individual companies used in 
this study was drawn from the Aspect Huntley and Worldscope (Factset) databases. Stock 
price and returns are from Standard and Poors (S&P), but where S&P data was unavailable, 
Factset data was used. The use of two databases of company fundamentals is to assist with 
error-checking and allows for a longer testing period than previous studies like Mar et al 
(2009) as Worldscope data is available from 1985. The AHM study makes the points that by 
reweighting a cap-weighted index, stocks with strong fundamentals but low market 
capitalization may be excluded; likewise, companies with poor fundamentals but high Page 9 of 37 
 
capitalization may get included. To avoid such possibilities, we start with the universe of all 
stocks listed on the ASX at the time of reconstitution each year.  
3.2 Index Construction 
3.2.1  Individual Indexes 
 
Fundamental indexes were constructed individually on each of the following measures. 
i.  Sales (Net) 
ii.  Book value 
iii.  Book value minus intangibles 
iv.  Operating income 
v.  Earnings before Interest and Taxes (EBIT) 
vi.  Total dividend paid 
vii.  Total dividend paid plus cash used to repurchase common stock (buybacks) 
viii.  Net payout 
ix.  Employee numbers 
 
Most of the above measures were selected from prior fundamental index research. The 
original AHM study used book value, operating income, revenue, dividends, and employment 
to form indexes. Other authors tested various combinations among these fundamental metrics 
in different markets. The only study of fundamental indexation in the Australian market, Mar 
et al (2009), employed just three measures - book value, operating income, and revenue.  
 
The ‘net payout’ metric used in this paper was earlier used by Walkshäusl and Lobe (2010). 
The idea behind using it is that net payout (defined as dividends plus cash paid for stock 
buybacks and minus cash received for stock issuances) might be a better representation of 
company size than pure dividends. A dividend plus buyback metric is included as a halfway 
point between the dividend and net payout measures, and to represent a larger amount of 
companies as many are excluded from the net payout index due to having a negative value 




4 Data for franking levels is not available until 1997, and therefore a “grossed-up dividend paid” or “grossed-up 
dividend paid plus buybacks” factor were excluded from this research. However, as the Australian imputation 
taxation system has an impact on the payment of dividends by distributing companies, it would be a worthwhile 
factor to include in future studies. Page 10 of 37 
 
Two fundamental measures are unique to this research paper. The ‘book value minus 
intangibles’ measure is included to obtain a more tangible evaluation of company size than 
the book value measure used in the AHM construction. Similarly, the EBIT measure is a new 
inclusion to testing of the fundamental indexation concept. Due to the similarity in 
definitions, it can be hypothesised that this metric will perform much like the operating 
income measure; however, it is included to see whether non-operating income and 
extraordinary items would substantially alter the result. 
 
At the end of March every year, fundamental indexes are formed and held for 12 months and 
then rebalanced. Three indexes are constructed for each measure using trailing 5-year average 
data, trailing 3-year average data and the latest data (hereon 5-yr, 3-yr and 1-yr). In line with 
the AHM construction methodology, the 3-yr and 5-yr indexes will take a simple average of 
the trailing data for each company. However, where a data field is blank for a certain year, 
the average is taken of the available data.
5 The companies are then ranked on the absolute 
value of the fundamental measure each year. Where the absolute value is negative, it is given 
a 0 value in order to hold only long positions within the index. The top 200 companies by 
each measure are used to construct the fundamental indexes. Companies within each index 
are weighted in accordance with the magnitude of the respective fundamental measures. It is 
to be noted that in some of the earlier years in our sample period, data is available for less 
than 200 companies. In these cases, all companies are included in the index in a weighted 
manner. There are a number of reasons for using the top 200 companies in constructing the 
fundamental indexes. First, the performance could be compared with the benchmark S&P 
ASX200, the most popular cap-weighted index in Australian market. Second, the Australian 
fundamental index portfolios run by both Realindex Investments and FTSE are made of 200 
companies. Finally, while using more companies would be more representative of the 
Australian market in later years of our sample period but data in the earlier years is limited. 
 
Consistent with the FTSE RAFI index construction methodology, the indexes are created at 
the end of March and rebalanced on an annual basis (FTSE, 2008). Blitz, van der Grient and 
van Vliet (2010) find that the rebalance date had little effect over the long run; thus March 
was selected purely on the basis of a pre-established methodology. Although Stotz, Döhnert, 
and Wanzenried (2007) conclude that daily rebalancing added up to 0.95% excess 
                                                             
5 This differs to the treatment of a data field for which the value is zero. Any field that had a value is included in 
the trailing average. Page 11 of 37 
 
performance a year, their results also show that it results in higher volatility. Moreover, such 
frequent rebalancing undermines the passive characteristic of fundamental indexation that the 
original AHM study intends to create, and results in a higher level of turnover.
6  
 
3.2.2 Composite index 
 
We also construct a composite index by combining the individual fundamental measures. 
Prior research papers of fundamental indexation used different combinations of individual 
fundamental measures, numbers of measures and trailing average periods for their composite 
index. As Arnott and West (2006) explain, the reasoning behind having a number of 
measures rather than just one is that each metric has a bias. For example, the ‘dividend paid’ 
metric has a bias towards established companies while the ‘employee number’ metric has a 
bias to large companies and places the same importance on a shelf-stacker as a biological 
scientist. Similarly, the ‘sales’ metric may be inconsistent across industries (such as financial 
services) and a portfolio based on ‘profits’ metric may overweight and underweight 
companies with highly cyclical income (Arnott & West, 2006).  
 
Four fundamental measures - book value, net sales, operating income and net payment - are 
being used for the composite portfolio to be consistent with prior research, which used 
between three and five fundamental measures in their composite index. Four measures seem 
sufficient to balance the biases from individual measures, but not so many that the 
transparency and repeatability of the process is eliminated. The employee numbers metric is 
excluded from the composite portfolio, due to the lack of data available, the errors in the 
source data and the fact that companies have not consistently reported employee numbers. 
 
As the first measure, we use book value minus intangibles to get a more tangible evaluation 
of book value. For this metric, we use just the latest data, rather than rolling averages, to 
ensure that it is representative of any significant changes to firm size as a result of mergers 
and acquisitions. The second factor used is net sales, consistent with most of the tests of the 
methodology which either use a sales or revenue metric. A 5-year trailing average is used for 
this metric as the AHM study recommends, in order to avoid substantially higher volatility 
and turnover. 
                                                             
6 The AHM study does examine rebalancing on a more frequent basis and found that the results were similar but 
with increased turnover. Page 12 of 37 
 
  
Both EBIT and operating income are used by studies in the past as representation of a 
company’s profitability. We use operating income for the construction of the composite 
portfolio to exclude non-operating income and extraordinary items. A 5-year trailing average 
is also used for this metric, to smooth potential overweights to companies with highly 
cyclical income. Finally, this composite portfolio contains a net payment metric . This is 
similar to the paper of Walkshäusl and Lobe (2010) and based on the testing done by 
Boudoukh, Michaely, Richardson, and Roberts (2007), who find that the stock return 
predictability in a time-series is much stronger when (net) payout yields are used instead of 
the dividend yield.  
 
As per the construction for individual indexes, each company is given a weight according to 
their relative size against the top 200 companies by that fundamental measure. For the 
composite index, the company’s weight across the four fundamental metrics is averaged. The 
top two-hundred companies on the average result are taken, and then the weights 
renormalised to equal one. Equal weighting of each metric is used for the composite portfolio 
for ease of replication and transparency. 
 
3.2.3  Comparative Indexes 
 
A cap-weighted index is constructed for a fair comparison. Free-float adjusted market 
capitalization is available from 1993 in the Worldscope database. Like the fundamental 
indexes, the cap-weighted index is rebalanced only once a year at the end of March. The end 
result turns out to be quite similar to that of the S&P ASX 200 and performance is highly 
correlated. The cap-weighted index (called Reference henceforth) is used in our analysis for 
the sub-period 1993-2010. For the full sample period i.e. 1985-2010, we use the ASX 200 




4.  Results 
4.1 Performance and Risk-Return Characteristics 
4.1.1  Individual Indexes 
 
We test the fundamental index portfolios and the market cap reference portfolio on 
performance by calculating monthly returns and comparing them both in terms of absolute 
and risk adjusted basis. To report the latter, we compute Sharpe ratio as per Sharpe (1966).
7 
As market capitalization data for individual companies is not available prior to 1993, there 
are two sets of performance comparisons: one for the entire sample period from 1985 
onwards and another for sub-sample period from 1993 onwards. For the first set of 
comparisons, we compare the performance of individual and composite fundamental indexes 
to the market cap-weighted S&P/ASX 200 (and prior to 31 May 1992, the ASX All 
Ordinaries Accumulation) index, which is the most well known benchmark of the Australian 
stock market. For the sub-sample period commencing from April 1993, we compare the 
performance of individual and composite fundamental indexes to the cap-weighted 
‘reference’ portfolio which we construct using the same methodology as that used for the 
fundamental indexes.  
 
In terms of total returns over the full 25- year period, all the fundamental indexes achieve 
statistically significant outperformance over the S&P/ASX 200 Index.  Similarly, since 1993 
each of the fundamental indexes demonstrates statistically significant outperformance over 
the reference market cap portfolio. Tables 1 and 2 show that, over the full sample and sub-
sample period, the individual fundamental indexes not only generate higher geometric annual 
returns than the cap-weighted indexes, many do so with similar or lower volatility. 













Net Sales - Latest  16.59%   $        46.44   16.02%  0.48  4.84%  3.91* 
Net Sales - 3 year  17.14%   $        52.22   15.97%  0.52  5.39%  4.43* 
Net Sales - 5 year  17.64%   $        58.06   15.93%  0.55  5.88%  4.88* 
Book Value - Latest  15.05%   $        33.27   16.18%  0.39  3.29%  3.36* 
Book Value - 3 year  15.40%   $        35.91   16.11%  0.41  3.64%  3.71* 
Book Value - 5 year  15.58%   $        37.31   15.96%  0.43  3.82%  3.88* 
                                                             
7 We also report ‘alpha’ measures following Jensen (1968), Fama and French (1993) and Carhart (1997) for the 
composite fundamental index and reference cap-weighted index in section 4.1.4 Page 14 of 37 
 
Book Value ex Intangibles - Latest  15.26%   $        34.83   16.06%  0.41  3.50%  3.04* 
Book Value ex Intangibles - 3 year  15.66%   $        37.99   16.05%  0.43  3.90%  3.45* 
Book Value ex Intangibles - 5 year  15.84%   $        39.49   15.91%  0.44  4.08%  3.65* 
Operating Income - Latest  15.20%   $        34.39   16.04%  0.40  3.44%  3.15* 
Operating Income - 3 year  15.72%   $        38.47   15.88%  0.44  3.96%  3.74* 
Operating Income - 5 year  15.56%   $        37.14   15.80%  0.43  3.80%  3.60* 
EBIT - Latest  15.83%   $        39.42   16.16%  0.43  4.08%  3.85* 
EBIT - 3 year  16.09%   $        41.70   15.97%  0.46  4.34%  4.19* 
EBIT - 5 year  15.79%   $        39.07   15.91%  0.44  4.03%  3.92* 
Dividend Paid - Latest  15.55%   $        37.09   15.17%  0.45  3.79%  2.63* 
Dividend Paid - 3 year  15.24%   $        34.67   15.11%  0.43  3.48%  2.64* 
Dividend Paid - 5 year  15.37%   $        35.65   14.97%  0.44  3.61%  2.76* 
Dividend + Buybacks - Latest  15.81%   $        39.22   15.11%  0.46  4.05%  2.84* 
Dividend + Buybacks - 3 year  15.35%   $        35.49   15.00%  0.44  3.59%  2.72* 
Dividend + Buybacks - 5 year  15.32%   $        35.29   14.82%  0.44  3.56%  2.70* 
Net Payment - Latest  16.27%   $        43.35   15.40%  0.48  4.52%  3.13* 
Net Payment - 3 year  15.77%   $        38.86   15.47%  0.45  4.01%  3.31* 
Net Payment - 5 year  15.66%   $        38.02   15.42%  0.45  3.91%  3.37* 
Employees - Latest  16.70%   $        47.54   16.13%  0.49  4.95%  3.02* 
Employees - 3 year  16.85%   $        49.02   15.93%  0.50  5.09%  3.28* 
Employees - 5 year  16.66%   $        47.08   15.86%  0.49  4.90%  3.15* 
S&P ASX 200 Accumulation  11.76%   $       16.10   16.72%  0.19  -  - 
*Excess returns are significant at 1% level  
 













Net Sales - Latest  15.67%   $     11.87   13.34%  0.48  4.49%  3.77** 
Net Sales - 3 year  16.34%   $     13.11   13.17%  0.52  5.17%  4.17** 
Net Sales - 5 year  17.09%   $     14.61   13.17%  0.55  5.92%  4.72** 
Book Value - Latest  13.29%   $       8.34   13.67%  0.36  2.12%  2.81** 
Book Value - 3 year  13.68%   $       8.85   13.54%  0.38  2.51%  3.10** 
Book Value - 5 year  13.91%   $       9.15   13.37%  0.40  2.74%  3.22** 
Book Value ex Intangibles - Latest  14.03%   $       9.32   13.72%  0.39  2.86%  2.52* 
Book Value ex Intangibles - 3 year  14.45%   $       9.92   13.64%  0.41  3.28%  2.85** 
Book Value ex Intangibles - 5 year  14.64%   $     10.21   13.43%  0.43  3.47%  3.06** 
Operating Income - Latest  13.66%   $       8.82   13.30%  0.39  2.49%  2.44* 
Operating Income - 3 year  14.05%   $       9.35   13.08%  0.41  2.88%  2.81** 
Operating Income - 5 year  13.78%   $       8.98   13.04%  0.40  2.61%  2.57* 
EBIT - Latest  14.72%   $     10.32   13.30%  0.44  3.55%  3.86** 
EBIT - 3 year  14.90%   $     10.60   13.12%  0.45  3.73%  4.00** 
EBIT - 5 year  14.54%   $     10.05   13.11%  0.43  3.37%  3.68** 
Dividend Paid - Latest  14.39%   $       9.83   12.87%  0.44  3.22%  2.41* 
Dividend Paid - 3 year  13.85%   $       9.07   12.55%  0.42  2.68%  2.18* 
Dividend Paid - 5 year  14.06%   $       9.37   12.39%  0.44  2.89%  2.33* 
Dividend + Buybacks - Latest  15.04%   $     10.83   12.77%  0.47  3.87%  3.16** 
Dividend + Buybacks - 3 year  14.29%   $       9.69   12.46%  0.44  3.12%  2.75** 
Dividend + Buybacks - 5 year  14.41%   $       9.86   12.25%  0.46  3.24%  2.83** 
Net Payment - Latest  16.40%   $     13.23   12.69%  0.54  5.23%  3.57** 
Net Payment - 3 year  14.91%   $     10.62   12.58%  0.47  3.74%  3.09** 
Net Payment - 5 year  14.65%   $     10.21   12.49%  0.46  3.47%  3.07** 
Employees - Latest  15.16%   $     11.02   12.91%  0.47  3.99%  2.55* Page 15 of 37 
 
Employees - 3 year  15.41%   $     11.42   12.65%  0.49  4.23%  2.67** 
Employees - 5 year  15.22%   $     11.11   12.56%  0.49  4.05%  2.52* 
Reference  11.17%   $       6.05   13.42%  0.27  -  - 
**Excess returns are significant at 1% level * Excess returns are significant at 5% level. 
 
Over the full sample period 1985-2010, the average geometric return for the individual 
fundamental indexes is 15.89%, which is 4.13% higher than the geometric mean return of the 
S&P ASX 200 index. From 1993 onwards, the individual fundamental indexes returned 
14.69% per annum on average, which was 3.52% higher than that of the cap-weighted 
reference portfolio. This is much higher than the magnitude of outperformance reported by 
previous studies in different geographical markets.
8 We find that the excess returns to be 
statistically significant for all individual and composite fundamental indexes.  
 
At 15.72%, the average volatility of the fundamental indexes over the full sample period is a 
full 1% lower than that of S&P ASX 200 index. For the sub-sample period commencing 
1993, the difference is much smaller but the average standard deviation of fundamental 
indexes is still 0.41% lower than that of the reference portfolio. This is contrary to Mar et al 
(2009) who found the volatility of the cap-weighted Australian index to be slightly lower than 
all of the individual fundamental indexes. However, the Sharpe ratio measures in both Mar et 
al (2009) and our paper show that all the individual fundamental indexes outperform the cap-
weighted counterparts on a risk-adjusted basis.  
 
As in the AHM study, among the individual fundamental indexes, we find the net sales 
portfolios have the highest terminal value. The portfolios formed on the basis of dividends 
and operating profits, on the other hand, fare the poorest but both of them outperform the cap-
weighted indexes quite easily. Also similar to findings of many past studies, our results show 
that the dividend portfolios have the lowest volatility. This is mainly due to the reason that 
dividend-paying companies are very often large and well-established ‘value’ companies with 
lower risk perception. The results for single year and multi-year fundamental indexes are 
quite similar. With the exception of the dividend indexes, the returns for multi-year indexes 
are marginally higher relative to single year indexes. In terms of volatility of returns, 
however, there is a noticeable decline in all indexes formed with longer period data. This 
                                                             
8 The AHM study finds the fundamental index returns are about 2% higher than the cap-weighted index in USA. 
Stotz et al (2010) and Mar et al (2009) reports similar magnitude of outperformance for European and 
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suggests that fundamental indexes that are constructed using multi-year data may provide 
superior risk-return profile for investors in most cases. 
   
4.1.2  Composite Fundamental Index 
 
As discussed in 3.5, the composite index was made up of four equally weighted fundamental 
metrics: five-year trailing average operating income, net payments, net sales and the latest 
book value minus intangibles. The performance results of the composite index, the individual 
constituents of the composite index, and the comparable indexes are provided in table 3.  
 
 





of $1  Volatility 
Panel A: 1985-2010 
Book Value ex Intangibles - Latest  15.26%***   $   34.83   16.06% 
Net Sales - 5 year  17.64%***   $   58.06   15.93% 
Operating Income - 5 year  15.56%***   $   37.14   15.80% 
Net Payment - 5 year  15.66%***   $   38.02   15.42% 
Average  16.03%   $   42.01   15.80% 
Composite  16.19%***   $   42.57   15.65% 
S&P ASX Accumulation  11.76%   $  16.10   16.72% 
 
 
Panel B: 1993 - 2010  
Book Value ex Intangibles - Latest  14.03%**  $     9.32  13.72% 
Net Sales - 5 year  17.09%***  $   14.61  13.17% 
Operating Income - 5 year  13.78%**  $     8.98  13.04% 
Net Payment - 5 year  14.65%***  $   10.21  12.49% 
Average  14.89%  $   10.78  13.10% 
Composite  14.99%***  $   10.97  12.91% 
Reference  11.17%  $    6.05  13.42% 
* Excess return statistically significant at 10% level. ** Excess return statistically significant at 5% level. *** Excess 
return statistically significant at 1% level. 
The performance of the composite index is strong over both time periods relative to the two 
market cap-weighted benchmarks. As the figures show, the composite index outperforms the 
cap-weighted index with lower volatility as well as outperforming the average of the four 
individual metrics.  
 
Having seen the superior risk-return characteristics of the composite index, it is still 
important for investors to know that there can be prolonged periods where the fundamental 
indexes underperform cap-weighted indexes. Chen, Chen and Bassett (2007) points out that Page 17 of 37 
 
fundamental weighting would not be profitable if actual prices stray far from fundamentals 
for long periods. We attempt to find out whether there is any relationship between market 
returns and performance of composite index. This is done by grouping rolling one year 
periods in terms of returns of S&P ASX 200 and finding out that over how many such 
periods the composite index returns are above those of the S&P ASX 200.  
 
Table 4: Composite Fundamental Index Wins over S&P ASX 200 Accumulation Index Using 1 Year 
Rolling Returns (1985-2010) 
Market Return  Composite Fundamental Index wins (%)  Number of periods 
greater than 30%  50%  42 
20% to 30%  47%  51 
10% to 20%  71%  75 
0% to 10%  86%  56 
-10% to 0%  91%  34 
-20% to -10%  89%  18 
less than -20%  100%  13 
 
Table 4 reports the composite index wins over the market cap-weighted index. It is clear that 
fundamental index wins are more frequent as market returns decrease.  In other words, the 
composite fundamental index consistently adds value in downward markets while value is 
added only about half the time in very strong market environments when returns are above 
20%. However, one has to be mindful that number of rolling one year periods of such high 
returns is not trivial. In fact, they are nearly a third of all rolling one year periods between 
1985 and 2010. 
 
We also analyse the periods of outperformance and underperformance of the composite index 
during the sub-sample period. Figure 1 depicts the excess return of the composite index over 
the comparable reference index on a rolling one year basis from 1993 to 2010. Two distinct 
periods of extended underperformance against the reference index are observed: January-
September 2000 and October 2004-November 2006. The first period of underperformance 
comes at the height of the “tech bubble”, which is consistent with findings of past studies. 
This period was a strong growth period when the cap-weighted index by its very construction 
benefitted by putting more weight into stocks whose price increased at a greater pace than the 
rest of the market. The second period of underperformance was also recorded during a 




Figure 1: Composite Fundamental Index 1 Year Rolling Excess Return over Reference Index 
 
 
Figure 2 shows excess return of the fundamental index on a 5-year rolling basis. In this case, 
any underperformance of the fundamental index is completely eliminated. The excess returns 
of the composite index in this case are always observed to be positive. Whilst based on data 
over a brief sample period of 17 years it would be inappropriate to conclude that such excess 
returns would exist in the future, this certainly lends support to the argument that investors 









































































































































































































4.1.3  Robustness Check 
 
To test the robustness of the outperformance using this methodology, we do three robustness 
checks for our results under varying economic and market conditions. First, we look into the 
performance of fundamental indexes relative to cap-weighted indexes over the contraction 
and expansion phases of the business cycle. These phases are defined in accordance with the 
identification of peaks and troughs of business cycles by months reported by Melbourne 
Institute (2010). The months from a peak to nearest future trough are included as contraction 
phase and those from trough to next peak as expansion phase. Second, relative performance 
over rising (bull) and falling (bear) markets is examined. A rising or falling market, for the 
purposes of this study, is simply characterised by a period of prolonged positive (negative) 
return in the stock market which results in a gain (loss) of over 15%. Finally, we compare 
relative performance over periods of rising and falling interest rates. An increase (decrease) 
by 100 basis points in the Reserve Bank of Australia’s (RBA) cash rate from the previous low 
(high) within a year is considered as rising (falling) interest rate regimes. Prior to the RBA’s 
targeting of cash rates, a 3-month rolling average is used to determine periods of rising and 
falling rates. The results are presented in table 5. 
 
 
Table 5: Fundamental Index performance in Different Economic and Market Conditions (1985 – 
2010) 
 
Panel A: Expanding and Contracting Phases of the Business Cycle  
  
Expanding Contracting 
Annual return  Volatility 
Sharpe 
Ratio Annual  return  Volatility 
Sharpe 
Ratio 
Net Sales - Latest  20.85%*  16.97%  0.552  10.49%**  14.38%  0.076 
Net Sales - 3 year  20.90%**  16.94%  0.563  11.73%***  14.33%  0.156 
Net Sales - 5 year  21.87%***  16.96%  0.634  11.57%**  14.18%  0.147 
Book Value - Latest  19.42%**  17.22% 0.509  8.80%  14.38%  -0.033 
Book Value - 3 year  20.05%***  17.25% 0.542  8.77%  14.10%  -0.036 
Book Value - 5 year  20.23%***  17.18% 0.555  8.94%  13.80%  -0.025 
Book Value ex Intangibles - Latest  19.67%*  17.13%  0.483  8.95%  14.19%  -0.023 
Book Value ex Intangibles - 3 year  20.24%**  17.22%  0.519  9.11%  13.98%  -0.013 
Book Value ex Intangibles - 5 year  20.30%**  17.17%  0.528  9.46%  13.68%  0.010 
Operating Income - Latest  18.51%** 17.14%  0.527 10.41%** 14.19%  0.071 
Operating Income - 3 year  19.52%** 16.95%  0.563 10.25%** 14.05%  0.062 
Operating Income - 5 year  19.33%** 16.97%  0.565 10.12%** 13.80%  0.054 
EBIT - Latest  20.20%**  17.01%  0.553  9.57%  14.70%  0.016 
EBIT - 3 year  20.44%***  16.90%  0.582  9.87%*  14.36%  0.036 
EBIT - 5 year  20.04%***  16.93%  0.572  9.69%*  14.13%  0.025 
Dividend Paid - Latest  20.12%**  16.11% 0.614  9.01%  13.52%  -0.020 
Dividend Paid - 3 year  19.75%**  16.12%  0.581  8.79%  13.31%  -0.036 Page 20 of 37 
 
Dividend Paid - 5 year  19.73%**  16.03%  0.587  9.12%  13.09%  -0.014 
Dividends + Buybacks - Latest  20.34%*  15.96%  0.626  9.32%  13.61%  0.001 
Dividends + Buybacks - 3 year  19.82%*  15.95%  0.574  8.96%  13.33%  -0.025 
Dividends + Buybacks - 5 year  19.68%*  15.83%  0.567  9.08%  13.04%  -0.016 
Net Payment - Latest  20.74%**  16.48% 0.653  9.88%  13.49%  0.039 
Net Payment - 3 year  20.41%**  16.54% 0.605  9.13%  13.59%  -0.012 
Net Payment - 5 year  20.34%**  16.52% 0.613  8.98%  13.45%  -0.022 
Employees - Latest  20.26%  16.79%  0.502  11.56%*  15.05%  0.137 
Employees - 3 year  20.89%*  16.66%  0.545  11.03%  14.69%  0.108 
Employees - 5 year  20.57%  16.62%  0.525  11.02%  14.59%  0.108 
Composite 20.22%***  16.78%  0.583 10.39%** 13.69%  0.073 
S&P ASX Accumulation  14.81%  18.12% 0.264  7.33%  14.32%  -0.128 
 
Panel B: Rising and falling stock markets  










Net Sales - Latest  62.10%  10.90%  15.64  -35.82%*  21.81%  -6.45 
Net Sales - 3yr  61.92%  10.76%  15.82  -36.03%**  22.28%  -6.35 
Net Sales - 5yr  61.88%  10.80%  15.74  -35.84%**  22.23%  -6.33 
Book Value - Latest  59.14%  11.18%  14.44  -37.11%  22.37%  -6.48 
Book Value - 3yr  59.36%  11.28%  14.37  -36.31%  22.40%  -6.36 
Book Value - 5yr  58.99%  11.20%  14.37  -35.44%*  22.26%  -6.27 
Book Value ex Intangibles - Latest  60.29%  11.09%  14.82  -36.65%  22.21%  -6.46 
Book Value ex Intangibles - 3yr  60.66%  11.16%  14.85  -36.18%  22.32%  -6.37 
Book Value ex Intangibles - 5yr  60.46%  11.07%  14.91  -35.43%*  22.12%  -6.31 
Operating Income - Latest  59.20%  10.67%  15.18  -37.50%  22.26%  -6.57 
Operating Income - 3yr  60.05%**  10.73%  15.38  -36.50%  21.72%  -6.59 
Operating Income - 5yr  59.43%*  10.74%  15.17  -36.30%  21.54%  -6.62 
EBIT - Latest  59.93%  10.97%  14.95  -37.69%  22.35%  -6.56 
EBIT - 3yr  60.85%  10.79%  15.49  -37.01%  21.90%  -6.60 
EBIT - 5yr  59.90%  10.77%  15.23  -37.02%  21.79%  -6.64 
Dividend Paid - Latest  58.16%  10.82% 14.57 -33.92%* 19.81% -6.79 
Dividend Paid - 3yr  57.60%  10.58%  14.78  -34.30%**  20.15%  -6.75 
Dividend Paid - 5yr  57.31%  10.47%  14.84  -33.52%**  20.00%  -6.67 
Dividends + Buybacks - Latest  58.48%  10.70%  14.83  -33.53%*  19.39%  -6.86 
Dividends + Buybacks - 3yr  57.48%  10.56%  14.77  -34.03%*  19.69%  -6.85 
Dividends + Buybacks - 5yr  56.86%  10.46%  14.71  -33.28%**  19.43%  -6.82 
Net Payment - Latest  60.54%  11.13% 14.91 -32.32%***  20.04% -6.45 
Net Payment - 3yr  60.04%  11.02%  14.94  -34.48%**  21.03%  -6.48 
Net Payment - 5yr  59.45%  10.97%  14.86  -34.24%**  20.88%  -6.50 
Employees - Latest  60.57%  11.69%  14.17  -35.03%*  20.92%  -6.60 
Employees - 3yr  61.03%  11.52%  14.51  -34.63%*  21.24%  -6.45 
Employees - 5yr  60.63%  11.52%  14.42  -34.51%*  21.28%  -6.42 
Composite  60.32%  10.65% 15.52 -35.58%**  21.64% -6.47 
S&P ASX 200 Accumulation  55.23%  10.44%  14.42  -40.36% 25.40%  -6.13 
Panel C: Increasing and decreasing interest rate environments  










Net Sales - Latest  12.59%  11.80%  0.41  20.41%***  19.07%  0.55 
Net Sales - 3yr  13.45%  11.75%  0.48  20.65%***  19.03%  0.56 
Net Sales - 5yr  13.23%  11.66%  0.47  21.86%***  19.01%  0.62 
Book Value - Latest  12.04%  11.69% 0.37 17.90%***  19.42% 0.42 Page 21 of 37 
 
Book Value - 3yr  11.93%  11.58% 0.36 18.70%***  19.35% 0.46 
Book Value - 5yr  11.94%  11.50% 0.37 19.04%***  19.16% 0.48 
Book Value ex Intangibles - Latest  11.94%  11.62%  0.36  18.41%***  19.26%  0.45 
Book Value ex Intangibles - 3yr  12.17%  11.53%  0.38  18.98%***  19.29%  0.48 
Book Value ex Intangibles - 5yr  12.21%  11.40%  0.39  19.30%***  19.13%  0.49 
Operating Income - Latest  12.23%  12.42% 0.36 18.01%***  18.77% 0.44 
Operating Income - 3yr  12.58%  12.23%  0.40  18.70%***  18.62%  0.48 
Operating Income - 5yr  12.17%  12.19%  0.37  18.78%***  18.52%  0.49 
EBIT - Latest  13.22%*  11.82%  0.46  18.30%***  19.33%  0.44 
EBIT - 3yr  13.05%*  11.67%  0.45  18.98%***  19.09%  0.48 
EBIT - 5yr  12.64%  11.73%  0.42  18.78%***  18.96%  0.47 
Dividend Paid - Latest  11.44%  11.17% 0.34 19.48%***  18.07% 0.53 
Dividend Paid - 3yr  11.22%  11.07%  0.32  19.08%***  18.02%  0.51 
Dividend Paid - 5yr  11.30%  10.99%  0.33  19.25%***  17.83%  0.53 
Dividend Paid + Buybacks - Latest  12.26%  11.18%  0.40  19.18%***  17.97%  0.52 
Dividend Paid + Buybacks - 3yr  11.82%  11.09%  0.37  18.70%***  17.85%  0.50 
Dividend Paid + Buybacks - 5yr  11.74%  10.97%  0.37  18.73%***  17.62%  0.51 
Net Payment - Latest  12.29%  11.48% 0.40 20.07%***  18.26% 0.56 
Net Payment - 3yr  12.15%  11.47% 0.38 19.21%***  18.39% 0.51 
Net Payment - 5yr  11.90%  11.45% 0.36 19.26%***  18.31% 0.52 
Employees - Latest  13.17%  12.18%  0.44  20.07%***  19.05%  0.53 
Employees - 3yr  13.12%  11.91%  0.45  20.39%***  18.88%  0.56 
Employees - 5yr  12.98%  11.78%  0.44  20.16%***  18.85%  0.55 
Composite 12.69%  11.61%  0.42  19.52%***  18.60%  0.52 
S&P/ASX 200 Accumulation  10.82%  12.17% 0.26  12.63%  20.05% 0.17 
* Excess return significant at 10% confidence level. ** Excess return significant at 5% confidence level. *** 
Excess return significant at 1% confidence level. 
 
Results in Panel A show that each of the individual fundamental indexes as well as the 
composite index outperformed the S&P/ASX 200 in both phases of the business cycle. 
However, there was variation in the extent of outperformance in the two phases. Whilst most 
of the individual indexes achieved statistically significant excess returns over the cap-
weighted index in expansion phase of the business cycle, this was not the case during the 
contraction phase. Only fundamental indexes based on net sales and operating income had 
significantly superior returns during these periods. Unsurprisingly, these indexes also had the 
highest Sharpe ratios. Dividend based indexes, on the other hand, performed the best among 
all indexes during expansions. But during contraction phase, like many other indexes, they 
resulted in negative Sharpe ratios. However, the composite indexes had positive Sharpe 
measures during both phases of the business cycle.  
 
Panel B shows the performance of the fundamental and the market cap indexes in bullish and 
bearish conditions in the equity markets. Bull (Bear) markets were typically characterised by 
extremely high (low) returns and low (high) volatilities. Under bullish market conditions, the 
individual fundamental indexes generally delivered higher returns as S&P/ ASX 200 with Page 22 of 37 
 
similar volatilities. However, the superior performance was not significant in most cases. In 
contrast, under bearish market conditions, more individual indexes like those based on 
dividends, employees and net sales outperformed the cap-weighted index on a statistically 
significant basis. The composite index outperformed the cap-weighted index under both 
bullish and bearish stock market conditions. The cap-weighted index had the higher volatility 




Panel C reports the results of the final test of robustness – relative performance over 
environments of falling and rising interest rates. All indexes recorded much higher returns 
and volatilities during falling interest rate environments compared to those witnessed when 
interest rates were rising. All the individual fundamental indexes outperformed the S&P/ASX 
200 on a risk adjusted basis under both regimes. Yet there was striking difference in 
statistical significance of the results in rising and falling interest rate environments. The 
superior performance of none of the individual fundamental indexes was significant in 
increasing interest rate environments while all the indexes outperformed S&P/ASX 200 at 
1% significance level under conditions when interest rates plummeted. 
 
4.1.4  Factor Characteristics 
 
Having established the superior performance of fundamental indexation among Australian 
equities over our sample period, we turn to examine the well-known risk factors and 
anomalies in finance literature- market, value, size and momentum - that could explain the 
excess returns. This is important to identify the source of outperformance i.e. whether the 
excess returns of fundamental indexes over the cap-weighted index could be explained by 
these risk factors. Initially the following regression is done for the fundamental index 
following Jensen (1968): 
                                                         (1) 
Where     is the monthly return on the fundamental index,      is the one month interbank 
borrowing rate and     is the monthly return on the cap-weighted index. The Jensen’s alpha 
                                                             
9 This higher volatility has perversely resulted in a higher Sharpe ratio for the cap-weighted index as the excess 
returns over risk free rate are negative in bear markets. Page 23 of 37 
 
is given by     which gives the excess return of fundamental index that is unexplained by the 
excess return of the cap-weighted market index. 
 
Second, we apply the 3-factor model of Fama and French (1993) to regress returns of the 
fundamental index to allow for risk adjustment after controlling for ‘size’ and ‘value’ factors. 
 
                                     .          .                              (2) 
 
In addition to the excess return of market index as in (1), the 3-factor model captures the 
excess return of small stocks over large stocks (SMB) and that of value stocks over growth 
stocks (HML). We proxy the SMB return by the return difference between monthly returns of 
ASX Small Ordinaries and ASX 100 index. We use the monthly HML data for Australia 
available on Ken French’s website.  
 
Finally, we employ the 4-factor model proposed by Carhart (1997) where the Fama-French 3-
factor model is extended by inclusion of the momentum (MOM) factor. This is given by 
                                     .          .          .                    (3) 
 
The MOM factor captures the persistence of returns and is computed by the return 
differentials between the winners and the loser stocks in the recent past. We follow Jegadeesh 
and Titman (1993) to construct momentum portfolios using monthly returns data from CRIF 
database. Stocks listed in the ASX are grouped into quintiles where the top quintile consists 
of best performers (winners) and the bottom quintile contains worst performers (losers) 
during past 6 months. Monthly returns are calculated by entering a long position in an equally 
weighted portfolio of winners and a short position in an equally weighted loser portfolio.
10 
 
Table 6 reports the results of the regressions using 1, 3, and 4 factors respectively for the 
composite index.
11 We also include the result of the 4-factor regression for the cap-weighted 
reference index. All the regressions are conducted with data from April 1993 onwards due to 
unavailability of data for all the factors prior to 1993. 
 
                                                             
10 Due to differential rates of return accruing to different portfolios, the momentum portfolios are rebalanced 
monthly following Jegadeesh and Titman (1993) throughout the holding period to maintain an equal weighting. 







Table 6: Factor Characteristics of Fundamental Indexes 









































** significant at 1% level, * significant at 5% level 
 
The R-Square value of the composite index is about 88% for all the three models showing 
that each of these models do a good job of explaining the variation of excess returns of 
fundamental indexes. For the cap-weighted reference index, the 4-factor model has even 
higher explanatory power (above 93%). The market factor is significant in all the models at 
1%. The market beta coefficients indicate that the composite index bears slightly less 
systematic risk than the overall market. Again, the magnitude of the beta coefficient for the 
composite index is slightly lower than that for the cap-weighted index which has a beta very 
close to 1. Hence, fundamental index returns could not be distinguished from cap-weighted 
index returns based on the market factor. 
  
Of the other three, the size (SMB) factor appears to have no significant relationship with the 
composite index. This may be surprising considering the expectation that the fundamental 
index would display a bias towards small stocks in comparison to a cap-weighted index. The 
relationship of the size factor with the cap-weighted reference portfolio is significant but 
negative.
12 This would suggest that the cap-weighted index returns are more closely 
                                                             
12 The size premium during our full sample period was negative. Past studies of the Australian market present 
conflicting results on the existence of the size premium. Some find evidence of a positive premium (e.g. Gaunt 
(2004)) while others report negative premium (e.g. Faff (2001). Most of them indicate the evidence on size 
factor is weaker compared to US market. Page 25 of 37 
 
correlated with large stocks returns than small stocks returns. For the composite index, the 
value (HML) factor is significant only in the 3 factor model but not in the 4-factor model. 
This is markedly different from most studies, including Mar et al. (2009) study in the 
Australian market, which attributes the superior returns of the fundamental index over the 
cap-weighted index to a value tilt in its composition. On the other hand, like Mar et al. 
(2009), we find a significant value bias in the cap-weighted index. The coefficient of the 
momentum factor is negative and significant. This is also reported in previous studies like 
Mar et al. (2009) and Stotz et al. (2010) that could be a result of the contrarian nature of the 
fundamental indexation strategy. Interestingly, the momentum factor also displays a negative 
relationship with the reference portfolio although the magnitude of the coefficient is half that 
of the composite index. 
 
The alpha coefficients for the composite index are quite revealing. The alphas are similar for 
the models with 1, 3, and 4 factors, which suggests that the additional risk factors do little to 
explain the excess returns of the fundamental index. The alphas for the composite index are 
significantly positive in all the models and show that the fundamental index is able to 
generate excess return that is not attributable to any of the 4 factors in the Carhart model. 
This contradicts the earlier findings of Mar et al. (2009) who reported that fundamental index 
superiority over cap-weighted index in Australia was largely attributable to value bias and the 
alpha was insignificant after controlling for the 4 factors.
13  
 
4.2 Portfolio Holdings Comparison 
 
Holdings are compared across portfolios at the individual company level and the sector level. 
At the individual company level, we examine the holdings of BHP Billiton stock in the cap-
weighted and fundamental indexes. This stock was selected due to the fact that as at March 
2009 (the final rebalance date for this study), it was the largest stock in the cap-weighted and 
fundamentals-weighted indexes, and it has been listed long enough to span the entire sample 
period. We also scrutinise the variation of allocation to different sectors over time for both 
the cap-weighted and fundamental composite index portfolios. Similar to Hsu and Campollo 
(2006), composite index holdings is compared with the market cap reference portfolio at a 
                                                             
13 The AHM (2005) study found positive alpha for fundamental index in the US market but they used a single 
factor model only.  
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sector level on a rolling 12 month basis. Quarterly sector allocation is calculated through 
Factset using the Factset sector groupings. Finally, we look at portfolio concentration, which 
we measure as the total weight allocated to the top ten stocks. Concentration is examined at 
the latest rebalance (March 2009) as well as an average from 1993 to 2009, using monthly 
price-drifted indexes. 
 
Table 7 shows the variations in annual allocated weights for BHP over the period April 1993 
to March 2009 and the standard deviation of these weights across different index portfolios. It 
illustrates that the 5-year trailing data indexes slightly underweighted the company compared 
to the 3-year indexes and the indexes based on the latest data for all individual fundamental 
indexes except the dividends and employees. The standard deviation of the weight also fell 
rapidly using longer term trailing average data. This seems to suggest that indexes 
constructed using data over longer periods would result in less variation in portfolio weights 
that in turn would reduce turnover. 
 
Table 7: Index Weighting of BHP Billiton (March 1993 to March 2009) 
   Latest  3 year  5 year 







Net  Sales  5.970% 0.896%  5.913% 0.729%  5.825%  0.571% 
Book  Value  5.585% 1.264%  5.558% 1.024%  5.491%  0.802% 
Book Value ex Intangibles  6.987% 1.636%  6.896% 1.151%  6.782%  0.900% 
Operating  Income  8.610% 5.236%  8.090% 4.263%  7.804%  3.422% 
EBIT  6.900% 3.642%  6.692% 3.370%  6.603%  2.845% 
Dividends  Paid  5.196% 1.533%  5.299% 1.206%  5.349%  1.143% 
Dividends Paid + Buybacks  5.777%  2.764% 5.584%  2.205% 5.411% 1.844% 
Net  Payment  4.833% 5.823%  4.306% 4.288%  4.174%  3.486% 
Employees  3.915% 1.019%  4.044% 0.874%  4.170%  0.755% 
Composite 6.190%  2.014% 
Reference  9.595%  3.457%             
 
Figure 3 shows the combined weight of the top ten companies as at the March 2009 
rebalance. Although each individual index has its biases, on examination of their holdings, it 
seems that the top 10 companies in the indexes are largely overlapping. At the 2009 rebalance 
across the nine individual fundamental indexes, 23 different companies made up the top ten 
holdings for the indexes constructed with 5 years’ trailing data; 24 companies for the indexes 
with 3 years’ trailing data and 26 companies for the indexes with latest data. It can be seen 
that for every fundamental measure except dividends and dividends plus buybacks, using the Page 27 of 37 
 








Much of the difference in portfolio concentration for individual fundamental indexes is 
evened out when we look at their average weights over a longer period. Figure 4 shows 
average concentration of the fundamental index portfolios using monthly holdings from April 
1993 to March 2009. Over the long run, the composite index appears to be less concentrated 
than the cap-weighted reference index, and therefore more diversified. There are only small 
differences in most of the fundamental indexes from using data over lagged periods of 
different lengths. The employees index is the only example of where concentration can be 
seen to be moving the opposite way i.e. it becomes more concentrated in the top ten stocks by 





















Figure 4: Average Index Weighting in Top Ten Companies (based on monthly holdings from March 
1993 to February 2010) 
 
The original AHM study and later papers like Hsu and Campollo (2006) take a look at the 
sector weights of the fundamental index portfolio through time against that of the cap-
weighted index. The authors illustrate the more static nature of the sector allocation of the 
fundamental index methodology, as it rebalances out of sectors that have performed well 
(such as technology sector during late 1990s) rather than increasing weight as price increases. 
Figures 5(a) and 5(b) show the rolling one-year sector weights for the composite and the cap-
weighted reference index. The sector allocation for composite fundamental index seems to be 
more stable than that of cap-weighted index over time.
14 Therefore, the Australian evidence 
appears to be in line with the findings of the above studies.
                                                             
14 Large changes in sector allocation within the composite fundamental index (and cap-weighted reference 
index) are primarily driven by entry or exit of large companies. For example, the Telecommunications sector 
saw a large boost in the 1998 rebalance, as Telstra (TLS) listed towards the end of the previous year. In the 














































































































































































































4.3 Turnover and Liquidity 
 
4.3.1  Turnover 
 
All the index portfolios are back-tested for turnover. Each portfolio is price drifted from the 
date of reconstitution (end of March) until the date of the following reconstitution. Turnover 
is calculated as the difference between the holdings of the price-drifted 31 March portfolio 
and the rebalance portfolio. One-way turnover is quoted in the results as, without cash flows, 
buys and sells are the same. The AHM study examined the reduction in excess return, 
assuming a 2% transaction cost (of that magnitude to include both transaction fees and price 
impact). Similarly, we look at excess return assuming 2% transaction costs which we 
calculate as follows: 
 
                                                                2%    (4) 
 
We also compute the magnitude of the transaction cost that is required to be incurred before 
excess returns from fundamental index are completely eroded. We call this the threshold 
transaction cost which is given by: 
 
                                                        ( 5 )  
 
Table 8 presents the average portfolio turnover for the different indexes. The results show 
that the portfolio turnovers for fundamental indexes are, as per expectation, much higher than 
the reference market cap-weighted index. However, they certainly seem to be lower in 
comparison to actively managed portfolios. Also the AHM study and subsequent papers like 
Arnott and West (2006) found that by using trailing average data for construction of 
fundamental indexes, rather than the latest data, turnover was minimised. We find that it is 
indeed the case. 
 
Table 8: Average Portfolio Turnover (1993 to 2010) 
   Latest  3 Year  5 Year 
Net Sales  14.21%  13.08%  12.56% 
Book Value  14.68%  13.08%  12.55% 
Book Value ex Intangibles  15.88%  13.47%  12.77% 
Operating Income  19.20%  13.87%  12.00% 
EBIT 18.53%  13.76%  11.84% Page 31 of 37 
 
Dividend Paid  20.47%  13.84%  12.44% 
Dividends + Buybacks  26.70%  15.57%  13.39% 
Net Payment  36.03%  18.21%  15.07% 





Higher turnover for any of the fundamental index portfolios obviously would result in higher 
transaction costs compared to the reference portfolio. The critical question here, however, is 
whether the transaction cost differences are large enough to neutralise the excess returns of 
the former over the latter. Table 9 shows excess return under the condition of 2% transaction 
costs (including market impact) assuming a flat fee across all buy and sell orders. Such 
transaction costs, we find, decrease the excess return of the composite index by 52 basis 
points bringing them down to 2.54% per annum. Remarkably, all the fundamental indexes are 
still able to achieve an excess return over the reference index after adjusting for transaction 
costs. 
 
Table 9: Net Excess Return of Fundamental Index over Reference 
Portfolio (March 1993 to March 2010) 
   Latest  3 year  5 year 
Net Sales  3.93%  4.65%  5.42% 
Book Value   1.53%  1.99%  2.24% 
Book Value ex Intangibles  2.23%  2.74%  2.96% 
Operating Income  1.72%  2.33%  2.13% 
EBIT 2.80%  3.18%  2.89% 
Dividend Paid  2.40%  2.12%  2.40% 
Dividend + Buybacks  2.80%  2.50%  2.70% 
Net Payment  3.79%  3.01%  2.87% 
Employees 3.28%  3.68%  3.56% 
Composite  2.54%       
 
From the above results, it appears that transaction costs need to be far larger than 2% in order 
to make an investor indifferent in choosing between fundamental index and a cap-weighted 
index. How large transaction costs need to be in order to erode excess return of the 
fundamental index over the market cap-weighted reference index? We estimate these for 
different fundamental indexes and report the same in table 10. The results suggest that 
transaction costs have to be substantially larger to nullify the superior performance of the 
fundamental indexes. For individual indexes, they have to be as high as 15.82% (almost 8 
times our assumed level) for an indexation strategy based on net sales. Even for a strategy 
based on operating income, the least successful of the fundamental measures in our study, Page 32 of 37 
 
transaction costs would have to increase by more than 200% to erode all excess returns over 
cap-weighted index. For the composite index, the costs have to go up by nearly 500% to 
bring the returns at par with the cap-weighted index. These results indicate that fundamental 
indexation’s superiority over traditional cap-weighted indexation is likely to prevail even in 
presence of transaction costs unless they are set at an unrealistically high level.
15 
 
Table 10: Required transaction costs to erode excess return over 
reference portfolio (March 1993 to March 2010) 
   Latest  3 Year  5 Year 
Net Sales  15.82%  19.77%  23.55% 
Book Value  7.22%  9.61%  10.90% 
Book Value ex Intangibles  9.02%  12.18%  13.59% 
Operating Income  6.49%  10.39%  10.87% 
EBIT 9.57%  13.55%  14.22% 
Dividend Paid  7.87%  9.67%  11.62% 
Dividends + Buybacks  7.25%  10.01%  12.10% 
Net Payment  7.26%  10.27%  11.53% 






A well-known virtue of cap-weighted indexes is liquidity due to holding stocks in proportion 
with their capitalization. Despite the fundamental indexes’ superior risk-adjusted 
performance demonstrated in this paper, lack of liquidity can potentially offset its advantage. 
This can happen if fundamental indexes place higher weightings on smaller, illiquid stocks. 
Difficulties in purchase and sale of the desired number of stocks would make it difficult for 
the investor to replicate the index and therefore, act as a potential deterrent to fundamental 
indexation. In this context, it is important to examine the liquidity characteristics of the 
fundamental indexes vis-à-vis the cap-weighted index. 
 
We measure liquidity in terms of CAP ratio. This is a ratio of average capitalization of the 
fundamental index weighted by the fundamental measure and the average capitalization of 
the market index. AHM study suggests that an inference to be made from this ratio is the 
                                                             
15 In discussing transaction costs and turnover of the composite fundamental Index, Arnott and West (2006) 
makes this pertinent point that the composite’s turnover tends to be in larger-capitalization issues that have 
witnessed changes in their fundamentals while the turnover of cap-weighted portfolios are mostly related to the 
smaller companies (higher transaction costs) that fall off or step into the cap-weighted list. The former’s 
reweighting of larger securities is likely to involve smaller transaction costs compared to the latter. 
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aggregate amount of money that can be invested in the fundamental indexes relative to the 
cap-weighted reference index. The CAP ratios for different fundamental indexes are shown in 
Figure 6. The results show fundamental indexes quite favourably in terms of their liquidity. 
For example, the amount of money that could be invested in the composite index portfolio 
(with its average CAP Ratio of 0.8048) is approximately four-fifths of that in the cap-
weighted reference index (with a CAP Ratio of 1). This suggests that the composite 
fundamental index for Australia has more capacity than its US counterpart that had a CAP 
Ratio 0.66 in the AHM study. Many individual fundamental indexes do better than the 
composite index with a few of them exceeding a CAP ratio of 1. 
 
 
Figure 6: Average CAP Ratio versus market cap reference (1993 to 2010) 
 
 
While reviewing portfolio composition in 4.2, we found that concentration is generally lower 
in indexes constructed from 5-year trailing data in comparison to those from 3-year trailing 
data and latest data. It is, therefore, expected that the CAP ratio would be lower in the 5-year 



















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































based on 5-year trailing average data, with the exception of ‘employees’ (again to be to be 





We have examined many facets of fundamental indexation in the Australian market between 
1985 and 2010, primarily focussing on whether this portfolio construction methodology adds 
value over traditional cap-weighted indexing for passive portfolio management. In line with 
prior empirical studies on fundamental indexation in other geographical markets, we found 
that fundamental indexes based on accounting measures of size like sales, book value, 
earnings, and cash flow outperformed the cap-weighted index with similar or lower volatility. 
Similarly, the composite fundamental index formed by combining the individual fundamental 
measures was found to outperform the reference index by over 350 basis points with lower 
volatility.  Robustness checks confirmed the outperformance across varying market 
conditions. Statistically significant excess returns, however, were not sustained in 
environments of rising stock markets and increasing interest rates. By investigating the 
periods of underperformance, we found that the composite fundamental index 
underperformed in strong bull markets and in times where prices stray from fundamentals for 
prolonged periods. However, over a rolling five-year time period, this underperformance 
diminishes and therefore the strategy seems to hold more appeal to investors with long-term 
horizons. Overall, the fundamental index strategy appears to have worked well within the 
universe of stocks listed in the ASX for the last 25 years. It has offered a low-turnover, high 
capacity indexing strategy with similar volatility to the cap-weighted index with the potential 
for outperformance between 2% and 5% over rolling five-year periods.  
 
Due to the higher turnover of stocks compared to the cap-weighted index, transaction costs 
could act as a potential deterrent for executing fundamental indexation strategies. However, 
we found such concern to be unfounded as all the indexes maintained their outperformance 
even when 2% transaction costs were taken into account. Our results indicate that the 
transaction costs need to increase to unrealistic levels to nullify the return advantage of 
fundamental indexation over cap-weighted indexation. Though most fundamental indexes are 
not as liquid as the cap-weighted index, they do not appear to be lagging behind too far in 
terms of capacity and therefore, investability. Page 35 of 37 
 
 
The superior performance of fundamental index in our study is not explained by value, size, 
or momentum factors as conjectured in the literature. This is significant as many researchers 
have suggested that the outperformance of the fundamental Index could be entirely attributed 
to these stylised factors. By using a reasonably long sample period of 25 years, which 
included significant market upswings and downturns, we find that the excess returns from 
fundamental indexation were not achieved on the back of the value premium. The evidence 
presented in this paper shows that it might be premature and simplistic to dismiss it as just a 
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